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SURVEY OF NEW YOK PRACTICE
In Lease Plan Fleet Corp. v. Johnson Transportation, Inc., 13 the
parties entered into a leasing agreement which provided for arbitration
of all controversies pertaining to the agreement. Thereafter, defendant
served a notice of intention to arbitrate which merely referred to "a
controversy arising out of an equipment lease contract" and specified
the date of the contract.214 Plaintiff contended that this notice was
defective in that it failed to state the specific nature of the dispute.2 15
The Supreme Court, Monroe County, agreed with the plaintiff and
enjoined the defendant from proceeding with arbitration, with leave
to serve a new notice properly describing the controversy to be arbi-
trated.2 16
Whether a dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement is an
issue determinable by a court.217 "[A] court must always inquire, when
a party wants to invoke its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbi-
tration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular
dispute. ' 218 Clearly, specification of the dispute is essential to determina-
tion of whether it is arbitrable. No person should be compelled to
arbitrate a particular issue unless he has contractually agreed that it
was to be arbitrable.
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii): Letter agreement on submissions held not to
limit the scope of a general arbitration clause, thereby permitting an
award for consequential damages.
CPLR 7511 enumerates the various grounds upon which an arbi-
tration award may be vacated. The broadest ground is a claim under
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) that the arbitrator has exceeded his power.219
Decisional law has interpreted this basis for vacatur to mean that an
arbitrator exceeds his power "only if [he gives] a completely irrational
construction of the provisions in dispute and in effect [makes] a new
contract for the parties." 220 The scope of the arbitrator's power has
213 67 Misc. 2d 822, 324 N.Y.S2d 928 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971) (mem.).
214 Id., 324 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 823, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 930, citing Nager Elec. Co. v. Weisman Constr. Corp.,
29 App. Div. 2d 939, 289 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1st Dep't 1968) (mem.).
217 Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Drake, 53 Misc. 2d 272, 278 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 Sr. JoHN's L. REV. 283, 310
(1967).
218 United Steel Workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1960), quoted
in In re Carey, 11 N.Y.2d 452, 456, 184 N.E2d 298, 300, 230 N.Y.2d 703, 705 (1962) (per
curiam).
219 It is well settled that arbitrators must act within any limits imposed by the ar-
bitration agreement which is the foundation of their authority and jurisdiction. 8 WK&M
7511.18.
220 National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y,2d 377, 383, 171 NXE.2d 302, 305, 208
N.YS.2d 951, 955 (1960) (emphasizing the immense power of interpretation given to the
aribtrator).
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been further augmented by the frequent use of very broad arbitration
clauses. Thus, a broad clause impliedly grants the power to award com-
pensatory damages,221 and indeed, it has been decided that a very broad
clause would justify the award of consequential damages.222 Therefore,
in some situations, the determination of what exactly constitutes the
arbitration agreement between the parties may be the critical issue. It
is now clear that a general arbitration clause complete in itself may be
limited by express exclusions in the contract-in-chief. 223 The contract
and the arbitration clause must be read together to determine the pre-
cise agreement between the parties.
Such a situation arose in United Buying Service International
Corp. v. United Buying Service of Northeastern New York, Inc., 224
which held that a letter agreement on submissions did not supersede
the general arbitration clause of the American Arbitration Association
contained in the franchise contract. Therefore, the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers by awarding consequential damages for loss of salary
to one of the franchisees. The court stated that the arbitration agree-
ment between the parties would be determined by readinig the fran-
chise agreement, the arbitration clause and the supplementary letter
agreement. 225 The dissent claimed that the letter agreement limited
the scope of the general clause, thereby precluding any award for con-
sequential damages. 220 It must be noted that if the letter agreement
was construed to limit the general arbitration clause, it must do so
impliedly, in contrast with the express limitation in Granite Worsted
Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.227 The majority was obviously
Thus, if there is any possible way of construing the agreement to encompass the
dispute and the arbitrator so construes it in assuming jurisdiction, the courts
would seem to lack authority to review the determination.
8 WK&M 1 7511.18. See also 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 82 (1961).
221 Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Stereotypers' Union No. One, 8 N.Y.2d 414, 171
N.E.2d 323, 208 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1960). For a discussion of this case, see 11 BurF.A.o L. REv.
85 (1961).
222 DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, 9 N.Y.2d 503, 174 N.E.2d 736, 215 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1961); A.D. Julliard & Co. v. Baitch & Castaldi, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 753, 152 N.Y.S.2d 394
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); see 11 BUrFALO L. REv. 78 (1961). But see De Lillo Constr.
Co. v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 102, 164 N.E.2d 95, 195 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1959).
228 [Where it is clear from the face of the award itself or from an examination
of the computations made by the arbitrator that the arbitrator has included an
element of damages specifically excluded by the contract pursuant to which he
obtained his very authority to act, he exceeds his powers under the contract and
the award thus made must be vacated upon proper applications.
Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 255 N.E.2d 168,
170, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 938 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN'S L. REv.
145, 175 (1970).
224 38 App. Div. 2d 75, 327 N.Y.S.2d 7 (lst Dep't 1971).
225 Id. at 78, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
226 Id. at 81, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
227 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969). See note 223 supra.
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influenced by the fact that the item constituting the consequential
damages was fully litigated without objection.22 Not only does the
decision reaffirm the view that the precise arbitration agreement be-
tveen the two parties is determined by a reading of the contract-in-
chief plus the arbitration clause and any supplements to it, but further
indicates that any limitation on a general clause such as the one in-
volved in the instant case must be an express one and that any implied
limitation will have little effect in restricting the arbitrator's broad
remedy power.
ARTICLE 78- PROCEEDING AGAINST BODY OR OFFICER
CPLR 7801: State comptroller may not be compelled to challenge the
legality of the state budget.
When an officer fails to perform a statutory duty which is purely
ministerial, an article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus can
be commenced to compel such performance. This remedy is not avail-
able, however, where the matter in issue is within the discretion of the
officer.229
In Posner v. Levitt,230 the Appellate Division, Third Department,
affirming the Supreme Court, Albany County, held that the state comp-
troller could not be compelled to institute a declaratory judgment
action to test the constitutionality of the state budget.2 31
The fact that the comptroller has the prerequisite standing to
maintain such an action does not require him to prosecute it if he deems
it unwise.2 32 Pointedly, the state constitution does not necessitate such
a course of action.
228Where parties to the arbitration litigate a particular issue not within the ex-
pressed description of the matters set forth in the submission, the parties waive the right
to object that such issue is not arbitrable. Ingardia Constr. Co. v. Dyker Bldg. Co., 14 App.
Div. 2d 23, 216 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Ist Dep't 1961).
229 Gimprick v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 401, 118 N.E.2d 578 (1954) (the grant of
credit for prior teaching experience by board of examiners is discretionary); Frey v. McCoy,
35 App. Div. 2d 1029, 316 N.Y.S.2d 166 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.) (State Director of Proba-
tion is not mandated under the correction law to conform with formulated staffing and
caseload standards; where workloads assigned do not conform to standards, the denial of
state funds is within the discretion of the proper official).
230 37 App. Div. 2d 331, 325 N.Y.S.2d 519 (3d Dep't 1971).
231 Id. at 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 521, citing Cortellini v. City of Niagara Falls, 257 App.
Div. 615, 14 N.Y.S.2d 924 (4th Dep't), reargument denied, 258 App. Div. 852, 16 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1939) (mem.); Goldberg v. Wagner, 9 Misc. 2d 663, 168 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1957), aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 857, 172 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't) (mem.), cert. denied,
857 U.S. 943 (1958).
2 2 37 App. Div. 2d at 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
1972]
